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Introduction
The purpose of this article is to subject the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’s (OECD) Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (hereafter, ‘the 
Guidelines’) to critical scrutiny.  The article uses empirical evidence to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the mechanism supporting the Guidelines. This mechanism is of 
significance to debates on the transnational regulation of corporations, since it is 
currently the most concrete regulatory process that exists to control socially harmful 
corporate activities at a global level. The Guidelines are implemented by signatory 
states to the OECD’s Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises.1 The Guidelines are now implemented by 48 signatory states, 
incorporating both OECD members and non-members (Bonucci and Kessedjian, 
2018). Although the Guidelines are voluntary principles and are not legally binding 
on companies, signatory states agree to ensure the implementation and observation of 
the principles set out therein. As we will show, the Guidelines have also been a key 
reference point for the development of policy that deals with the human rights 
violations of business in the UN Human Rights Council.
The article begins by discussing the centrality of a principle of consensus that 
connects both the Guidelines and the epistemological assumptions underpinning the 
mechanism: the normative assumption that the process should be based upon a 
consensus of interests between the complainant and the company. It then presents a 
re-categorisation of the outcomes of OECD cases as a basis for analysing – both 
quantitatively and qualitatively – more precisely how those cases are resolved in 
practice. In doing so, the paper provides empirical evidence to support a critical 
evaluation of two key claims made by proponents of the process: first that the 
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Specific Instance Mechanism encourages mutually agreed – consensual – outcomes, 
and second that the process has been enhanced following its 2011 revision. The article 
concludes by discussing how the Guidelines’ reliance on the theory and practice of 
consensus-building ultimately shapes their success, before noting how the findings set 
out herein can inform the development of a new treaty on business and human rights 
in the UN Human Rights Council.
The Idea of ‘Consensus’ in the OECD Guidelines
The OECD Guidelines are unique insofar as they are “the only corporate 
responsibility instrument formally adopted by states” (Černič, 2010, p. 70) that is 
truly global. The Guidelines were first adopted in 1976 and have since been amended 
five times, the latest amendment adopted in 2011 (Bonucci and Kessedjian, 2018).  
Under the Guidelines, member states are obliged to set up National Contact Points 
(NCPs) that have responsibility for addressing issues of implementation in specific 
instances. Although the NCPs have existed since 1984, the Specific Instance 
Mechanism itself was only introduced in the 2000 revision of the Guidelines. Most 
NCPs are located in government departments: the UK NCP, for example, is based in 
the Department for International Trade and Development. The work of NCPs are 
typically overseen by a mix of representatives of business, trade unions and non-
governmental organisations (see, for example, UK NCP, n.d.).
The Guidelines cover the following areas: general policies (containing specific 
recommendations to corporations about compliance); disclosure of information; 
human rights standards; employment and industrial relations; environmental 
protection; combating bribery; consumer interests; science and technology; 
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competition; taxation; and bribery, solicitation and extortion. They set out standards 
of conduct that are based upon a selection of international instruments and standards, 
including: the UDHR; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work; the Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions; the UN 
Convention against Corruption; the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development; the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making, and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters; and ISO standards, 
such as the Standard on Environmental Management Systems (OECD, 2011, pp. 32, 
44, 49 and 50).
Jill Murray (2001) notes that the establishment of the Guidelines stemmed directly 
from the demands of developing countries during the 1960s and 1970s to limit the 
role of TNCs as conduits for the political aspirations of the most powerful 
governments.  Developed nations also supported the Guidelines as a form of 
protection for their corporations from interference by host states. The 1976 
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises – to which the 
Guidelines belong – was adopted to give foreign corporations treatment “consistent 
with international law and no less favourable than that accorded in like situations to 
domestic enterprises” (OECD, 1976). 
This context, in which we must understand the emergence of the Guidelines, also has 
features that are common to the political and economic development of OECD 
member states themselves in this period.   This context is commonly referred to as the 
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‘post-war consensus’:  the period of social compromise in many developed nations 
following World War II that saw a shift towards the establishment of social 
protections in the form of expanded regulatory mechanisms and a welfare safety-net.  
In political and historical analyses, this shorthand description of a myriad of highly 
complex and differentiated processes is typically over-simplified, and can be 
criticised for not paying attention to the grossly uneven development across different 
national contexts.  Nonetheless, the idealised notion of a ‘post-war consensus’ has 
been a weather vane concept to the most influential policy makers and analysts. 
This pluralist consensus is consistent with the dominant approach to regulation in 
OECD countries at a national level.  This dominant mode of regulation supports a 
‘consensus’ or ‘co-operative’ model of regulation, in which a series of fundamental, 
pluralist commitments are shared (Tombs and Whyte, 2010).  This model is based 
upon the idea that power in modern social orders is dispersed rather than 
concentrated, that a variety of interests can be mobilized to influence the formal 
political agenda, and that social change, through mobilization of those interests, is 
possible (Tombs and Whyte, 2013).  Consensus or co-operative models of regulation 
on the one hand, and neo-liberal political economy on the one hand, are each 
reducible to the view that a mutually beneficial co-incidence of interests amongst 
apparently antagonistic parties can be reached via relatively little or no state 
intervention. Thus, whether consciously or not, both consensual/co-operative models 
of regulation, and neo-liberal approaches to regulation, provide a closely coherent 
theoretical justification for currently dominant strategies of regulation. In national 
regulatory systems, this typically means that if government withdraws from 
regulatory enforcement – making it less likely that workplaces will be inspected, less 
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likely that inspections will result in enforcement, less likely the enforcement is of the 
more rather than less punitive type – then regulatory improvements are left in the 
realm of self-regulation: autonomous decisions by corporations themselves.  Or, as 
Tombs (2016) puts it, regulation without enforcement.
The framework of this pluralist socio-economic consensus is etched into the 
principles that inform the work of the OECD.  The first principle establishes the core 
aim of the Guidelines as ensuring “mutual confidence between enterprises and the 
societies in which they operate …” It is an interesting choice of terms.  Mutual 
confidence rather than dispute resolution.  The commentary accompanying the 
Guidelines emphasises the voluntary nature of the obligations placed on corporations, 
whilst at the same time emphasising the binding responsibility placed on signatory 
states. The Guidelines defer this ‘binding’ commitment to national laws and practices. 
The founding concepts and principles thus assert that: 
Obeying domestic laws is the first obligation of enterprises. The Guidelines 
are not a substitute for nor should they be considered to override domestic law 
and regulation. While the Guidelines extend beyond the law in many cases, 
they should not and are not intended to place an enterprise in situations where 
it faces conflicting requirements. However, in countries where domestic laws 
and regulations conflict with the principles and standards of the Guidelines, 
enterprises should seek ways to honour such principles and standards to the 
fullest extent which does not place them in violation of domestic law (OECD, 
2011, p. 17).
In other words, where domestic law is lacking or too weak to ensure compliance with 
the standards laid out in the Guidelines, the default position is self-regulation; or in 
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the words of the Guidelines, corporations should “seek ways to honour such 
principles” themselves.  In order to ensure compliance, the Guidelines establish a 
process of remedy: if principles are not honoured by corporations, then complainants 
are able to seek review by the appropriate NCP. 
The role of the NCP is not envisaged as a watchdog, or a judicial mechanism that will 
make judgements about courses of action that any corporation might follow, even if 
there are obvious breaches of the Guidelines.  Rather, the Guidelines note: “[t]he NCP 
will offer a forum for discussion and assist the business community, worker 
organisations, other non-governmental organisations, and other interested parties 
concerned to deal with the issues raised in an efficient and timely manner.” 
The regulatory approach followed by the NCP mechanism thus emphasises 
techniques of persuasion, bargaining and compromise between stakeholder groups as 
the most successful strategy.  The process is therefore best described as a 
‘compliance’ or ‘consensus’ approach which encourages self-regulation, whereby 
corporations are responsible for monitoring and enforcing their own legal compliance 
as part of minimalist regulatory framework (Pearce and Tombs, 1990). ‘Self-
regulation’ – a model of regulation where corporations are trusted to monitor and 
observe their own legal compliance – in fact constitutes the dominant approach to the 
‘regulation’ of harmful business activities in OECD countries (Tombs and Whyte, 
2015). 
The OECD Guidelines reflect this general approach insofar as they place significant 
emphasis upon mutual-cooperation between parties and self-regulation. A directly 
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7
comparable approach to consensus building can be found underpinning the work an 
influential policy maker who is important to our analysis in this paper.  John Ruggie, 
the former UN Special Representative to the Secretary General on the Issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Entities, applies a 
conceptual framework of ‘embedded liberalism’ that he devised over 30 years ago as 
a political scientist that foregrounds the idea of the post-war consensus.  This 
conceptual framework argues that there now exists a broad agreement across nations 
on the basis of how the global economy should be run: there is general agreement that 
we should encourage open trade across nations, based on principles of capital 
accumulation, and at the same time, there is a general agreement about the counter-
veiling need for a prescribed minima of state intervention, social protection and 
regulation.  This conceptual approach formed the bedrock of Ruggie’s work for the 
UN, and in particular, his ‘Guiding Principles’ rely upon a pluralist consensus 
approach that assumes that states, international bodies like the UN and private 
corporations have a common interest in promoting the same approach to development 
(for a full discussion of this policy process see Khoury and Whyte, 2017).
As part of this consensus approach, Ruggie has consistently promoted the potential 
for the Guidelines to set standards (Ruggie, 2013; Ruggie and Nelson, 2015; also, 
Mares, 2010).  Ruggie’s Guiding Principles had been enthusiastically adopted by the 
OECD in the 2010 revision of the Guidelines. Indeed, the latest version of the 
Guidelines notes that it “draws upon the [UN] Framework for Business and Human 
Rights ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ and is in line with the Guiding Principles for its 
Implementation” (OECD, 2011, p. 31). 
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In the sense that it claimed the support of the key parties involved in the debate – 
corporations, governments and NGOs – the Ruggie agenda adopts a consensus 
approach to regulation par excellence (Parker and Howe, 2012).  However, since its 
adoption by the UN Human Rights Council, the Ruggie consensus has begun to 
unravel (Bittle and Snider, 2013; Khoury and Whyte, 2017). The precariousness of 
Ruggie’s consensus building was fully revealed in September 2013 when Ecuador, 
supported by a further eighty-four member states, explicitly rejected Ruggie’s 
voluntarist approach to introduce a binding legal instrument “to provide appropriate 
protection, justice and remedy to the victims of human rights abuses directly resulting 
from or related to the activities of some transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises”. This motion was supported by more than 530 civil society organisations 
and in June 2014 was supported by a majority of the UN Human Rights Council. 
In what follows, we explore the concrete realities of the consensus approach adopted 
by the Guidelines.  It is an approach that is somewhat strengthened in 2011, and for 
this reason we expose the implementation of the Guidelines in the post-2011 period 
under particular scrutiny.  We do so by presenting a detailed and original analysis of 
the outcome of cases that seek resolution through the Specific Instance Mechanism.  
It is to this analysis that the next section of the paper turns.
Complaints heard by NCPs, 2002-2016
Some human rights NGOs have been trying to encourage wider use or propose 
reforms to enhance the use of the Guidelines, for several years now (see Ruggie and 
Nelson, 2015).2 Almost all complaints made through this process relating to human 
rights violations tend to be made by NGOs and by trade unions concerned with labour 
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rights. The OECD confirms that NGOs have historically been the leading group using 
the NCPs, followed by trade unions (OECD, 2016). Indeed, only a small minority of 
cases are taken by other parties. 
The data reveals that in the period between August 2002 and July 2012 trade unions 
had a higher rate of submission to the NCP process than NGOs (NGOs filed 130 
cases; trade unions filed 150 cases). However, since the 2011 reform, there has been a 
reversal of this trend and NGOs have submitted a much higher number of complaints 
compared with trade unions (NGOs have lodged 106 complaints, whereas trade 
unions have submitted only 32 complaints). Of those complaints, the data reveals a 
wide gap between the success rates between the two groups. Trade unions have had 
considerably more success in getting their cases accepted by NCPs, with only 5 cases 
(or approximately 15%) rejected outright. Whereas NGOs had 50 cases rejected 
outright (just under 50%). Despite this relatively high rejection rate, since the latest 
reform, it NGOs seem to be more optimistic about the potential of the NCPs.  We 
return to this point in the conclusion to this paper.  For the time being, we direct our 
analysis to the broad sample of cases initiated by both trade unions and NGOs.
The analysis that follows is based upon a total of 403 cases that were sent to NCPs for 
resolution.  Those cases were recorded by the Trade Union Advisory Committee to 
the OECD (TUAC) and the NGO OECDWatch from the start of introduction of the 
Specific Instance Mechanism in August 2002 to August 2016. This data includes a 
large majority of cases initiated under this procedure; and by far the largest single 
category of cases dealt with through the NCPs complaints procedure relate to human 
rights abuses (OECDWatch, 2014). This data is therefore relatively robust as an 
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indication of the overall activity of the Specific Instance Mechanism: the two datasets 
constitute a relatively comprehensive and respected source of data on human rights 
cases (for a more in-depth discussion of those sources see Ruggie and Nelson, 2015). 
The OECD categorises three very broad outcomes from cases lodged with a NCP. 
Those possible outcomes are classified in the Specific Instance Mechanism and 
recorded by NCPs as follows: 




• ‘Concluded’ includes all specific instances that fall in the categories:
-specific instances closed after initial assessment
- specific instances closed after assistance to parties
• ‘Not accepted’ indicates that a specific instance has not been accepted for 
assessment.
These categories are very general categories and encompass a breadth of outcomes 
that blurs the significance of the case outcomes.  The OECDWatch database offers 
more nuance, recording outcomes from cases lodged with a NCP using the following 
categories: 
• ‘Concluded’: the case has been accepted by the NCP and there has been 
some negotiation between parties.  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• ‘Closed’: cases can be closed by the NCP if there is no likelihood of 
agreement, or if, after initial investigation, it decides there is no case to 
answer.  
• ‘Rejected’: the NCP has decided there is no evidence of a breach and 
therefore no case to answer.  
• ‘Blocked’: cases in which there has been a delay in proceedings, normally 
as a result of a lack of cooperation or inability to respond to NCP requests. 
• ‘Withdrawn’: cases in which the complainant has withdrawn the 
complaint. 
However, a reading through of the summaries of cases in the initial stages of writing 
this article persuaded us to reframe both the OECD and OECDWatch categories.  We 
did this because it became clear from our initial reading of the case summaries that 
were available to us that an interpretation of the data using those categories can create 
distortions in the interpretation of the data. Our first observation in this respect is that 
there are some types of case outcomes that are significant in terms of numbers but not 
counted separately in the existing categories. Those included the cases that have been 
suspended and cases where no decision has been reached.  There were also a number 
of cases that we could not appraise in our analysis since there was not enough 
information logged by the NCP to meaningfully assess or understand the outcome. 
We therefore created a new category: ‘Pending, Suspended or No Information.’ 
Second, we found that often some of the Rejected and Closed case categories shared 
some characteristic similarities, and often it appeared as if the same cases might have 
been placed in either of those categories. This is because in both of those types of 
case, the NCP plays an active role in either preventing those cases from being heard 
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in the first place, or in closing them after the point that they have been initiated. We 
therefore collapsed those categories into a single ‘Rejected and Closed’ category. 
Third, we delineated a category of Concluded and Withdrawn cases. These are cases 
in which the complaint has been accepted and the case has reached its end-point 
without being either rejected or closed by the NCP.  
Fourth, we retained the OECDWatch category of ‘Blocked’ cases in which there was 
a delay in the process, normally as a result of a lack of cooperation or inability to 
respond to NCP requests, since from our reading of the cases we surmised that this 
category accurately captured this outcome.
Our four categories thus sought to set out a schematic way of reading the progress of 
cases through the Specific Instance Mechanism process in a way that allowed us to 
understand the material consequences of the outcomes more clearly. We analysed 403 
cases that fell within the period August 2002 to August 2016, by applying our 
categories.3 From this initial analysis, we can observe that in the fourteen-year period 
analysed, there were 139 Rejected or Closed cases (35%), 191 Concluded or 
Withdrawn cases (47%), 15 Blocked cases (4%), and 58 cases in which decisions had 
been Suspended, were Pending or where No Information (14%) had been provided to 
allow us to know anything about the details of the case. 
Positive Outcomes?
Given that by far the largest category is the Concluded or Withdrawn category, first 
impressions seem to indicate that almost half of all cases have a positive outcome (in 
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the sense that they have apparently reached the end-point of the complaint process 
and therefore have been resolved in some way).  Indeed, it is this category of cases 
that appear to have been resolved in some way that we are most interested in, since 
this is the category that can tell us both the good news stories about how complaints 
were most successfully concluded, and the bad news stories about how they were not.  
In order to explore the detail of the ways in which those cases were concluded we 
therefore analysed the data in more detail to probe what happened in those 191 cases 
included in the Concluded or Withdrawn category. 
As we proceeded, we found a further twelve cases in the Concluded or Withdrawn 
category in which there was simply not enough information provided to precisely 
assess the outcome. After filtering those cases out, we were left with a total of 179 
cases.  In order to analyse the outcome of those 179 Concluded or Withdrawn cases in 
more detail, we delineated a further five types of cases within this category:
• Cases that yielded a mutually agreed outcome (n=49) or 27%; 
• Unresolved cases, or cases in which one or more parties had not reached 
agreement about the outcome (n=102) or 57%;
• Cases that remained only partially resolved and therefore remained 
partially unresolved (n=10) or 6%;
• Cases that were resolved via a separate process that did not require the 
intervention of the NCP (n=13) or 7%;
• Cases in which external factors in the dispute between the parties changed 
the material outcome (e.g. corporate takeovers, corporations going in to 
bankruptcy or corporations ceasing operations in that country) (n=5) or 
3%.
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This analysis shows that forty-nine cases within the Concluded or Withdrawn 
category yielded a ‘positive’ outcome that was mutually agreed by all parties.  This 
amounts to approximately three to four cases on average per year (or about one in 
eight of our total number of 403 cases). 
The majority of those Concluded or Withdrawn cases were not mutually agreed by all 
parties.  Because of the sheer scale of cases that ‘failed’ to reach mutually agreed 
outcomes, those cases warrant further analysis. It is to the analysis of the 112 
‘unresolved’ or ‘partially resolved’ cases that the paper now turns. In the section that 
follows, we identify four separate types of ‘system blockages’ that prevented those 
cases reaching a successful outcome.
System Blockages4
1 A lack of cooperation
Of the cases that are included in our Unresolved category noted above, a significant 
number (just under half) remained unresolved because of a lack of co-operation in the 
process shown by the corporation. The intransigence of corporations and a brazen 
lack of cooperation was visible across a range of different cases (e.g. Sherpa et al. v 
First Quantum Minerals; and Glencore International AG; MiningWatch Canada et al. 
v Barrick Gold Corporation; Amnesty International and FoE v Shell; ECCHR, Sherpa 
& UGF v ICT Cotton;  Sherpa et al v Financière du Champ de Mars; Bolloré; and 
SOCFINAL; ForUM and FoE Norway v Cermag ASA; Survival International v 
Vendanta Resources plc; Global Witness v Afrimex; Nepenthes v Dalhoff, Larsen & 
Hornemann (DLH); GermanWatch v Bayer; CCC v Adidas). In a further set of cases, 
the companies either simply refused any involvement with the process (e.g. CIPCE v 
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Skanska; CGTP et al. v Grupo Altas Cumbres; Thai and Filipino labour unions v 
Triumph International; FREDEMI coalition v Goldcorp; and CEDHA v Xstrata 
Copper), obstructed the process, (e.g. Fenceline Community and FoE NL v Royal 
Dutch Shell); and/or refused mediation by the NCP (e.g. Cornerhouse v Rolls Royce; 
BAE Systems; and Airbus). 
In Norwegian Support Committee for Western Sahara v Sjøvik, the parties agreed 
upon recommendations to the Norwegian government and to the steps the company 
would take to comply with the requirements set out in the OECD Guidelines. 
However, Sjøvik later refus d to disclose what and how it has respected and/or 
implemented the Guidelines’ due diligence provisions that it had agreed to; the 
complainant therefore has no way of knowing whether the company is honouring the 
agreement signed by both parties. 
In a small, but significant number of cases, developments in other legal proceedings 
relating to the same case preclude an NCP decision.  In some cases, this has led to 
corporations unilaterally withdrawing from the case.  In the cases CLEC & ERI v 
Florida Crystals Corporation; American Sugar Refining Incorporated; Sugar Cane 
Growers Cooperative of Florida; Fanjul Corporation the companies initially agreed 
to mediation, but later withdrew from the process when parallel civil proceedings 
were initiated by the victims, although parallel proceedings are not in themselves 
enough not to establish mediation. 
2 A lack of political will 
Several cases demonstrate that NCPs are often reluctant to force an outcome that 
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imposes punitive conditions on the corporations that are the subject of complaints. 
Some observers have noted that often corporations are given preferential treatment in 
the process.  Černič (2010, p. 82) has noted, for example, that “[i]n many OECD 
countries major concerns have been expressed about the way NCPs arrive at the 
statement agreed by the company, the complainant and the NCP by first contacting 
the company not the complainant”. For him, this is perhaps unsurprising given that 
NCPs are annexed to governments that do a great deal of diplomatic work on behalf 
of their corporations operating abroad:
… since most of the NCPs are located within business or industry departments 
of governments, it appears that they are more inclined to support business 
activities. For example, the UK NCP until recently discussed the initial 
assessment of a complaint with the companies first and only later with the 
complainant. There is no simultaneous discussion and companies have been 
given higher degree of access to the NCP (Černič, 2008, p. 94).
This observation is entirely consistent with the regulatory consensus approach 
adopted by the OECD and its member states (as set out earlier in this paper).  This 
might go some way to explaining a lack of political will on the part of NCPs to 
intervene in ways that challenge corporations.  Thus, some officially ‘Withdrawn’ 
cases were blocked from going forward by the NCP (e.g. RAID v Ridgepoint; 
Tremalt; and Alex Stewart (Assayers) Ltd.).  In other cases, the NCP was considered 
by the complainant as incapable of contributing to a meaningful resolution to the 
dispute (e.g. Amnesty International and Friends of the Earth v Shell), or the NCP 
simply ignored grievances by the complainants concerning the process (e.g. CCC & 
ICN v G-Star). These cases were thus ‘Withdrawn’ following extreme dissatisfaction 
with the NCP process on the part of complainants.  Ultimately none were resolved, 
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apart from the latter through an external process involving the Dutch Minister of 
Economic Affairs. The Dutch NCP responsible for the case CCC & ICN v G-Star 
declared it was made redundant when the Dutch Minister took over the mediation 
process, and ultimately ignored the complainants’ reservations about the NCP’s 
withdrawal from the process. 
Some NCPs demonstrated a lack of commitment to their own process, simply closing 
cases unilaterally after limited attempts at mediation, stating no consensual agreement 
was possible (e.g. Global Sports Technology (Beteiligungsgesellschaft) v Austrian 
Trade Unions); without having met with the unions or making a public statement (e.g. 
Nestlé v Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), International Union of 
Food Workers, and the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and 
General Workers’ Union (ICEM)); based on the company’s affirmation of its 
intention to abide by a court order to reinstate the dismissed workers although it had 
in fact already convened early retirement and severance schemes with many of them  
(e.g. Honda v International Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF)); or claimed that they 
simply could not offer any useful intervention (e.g. Eiffage Energie v Fédération 
Nationale des Salariés de la Construction et du Bois de la CGT, la Fédération 
Nationale Construction Bois de la CFDT and CFE CGC BTP).  In the case Novartis v 
Austrian Union of Salaried Private Sector Employees, the NCP released a watered-
down version of its final statement that glorified the company for its corporate social 
responsibility efforts, including a social plan for dismissed employees. The NCP 
failed to acknowledge the role the trade union had played in obtaining the social plan 
(namely through a parallel legal complaints procedure which had forced Novartis to 
negotiate the plan).  
Page 17 of 43
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cjhr  Email: jhr@uconn.edu





























































For Peer Review Only
18
In other cases, the NCPs simply excluded complainants from negotiations (as in CBE 
v National Grid Transco and RAID v Avient) or proved incapable of dealing with 
complaints (e.g. CEDHA v Xstrata Copper). In such cases, the NCPs seem to go to 
great lengths to avoid engaging with the complaints in any serious manner. In another 
set of cases (Pobal Chill Chomain Community et al. v Marathon Oil; Statoil; and 
Shell), the NCP denied the admissibility of the case, ostensibly because the companies 
claimed they already had a ‘legal’ contract with the government that they had 
complied with, even though the complaint formally disputed the compliance of those 
contracts with the OECD Guidelines.  
In the case Reprieve v British Telecommunications, the complainants made the 
assertion that there is a clear bias in favour of companies. The NGO complained that 
throughout the process the company’s assertions were taken at face value without any 
substantiating evidence, and that a greater onus was placed on the NGO to 
substantiate the complaint. NGO Amnesty International concluded that the UK NCP 
was both woefully under-resourced and clearly exhibiting bias towards corporations 
in the cases it analysed.  OECD Watch, has also criticised NCPs for their uneven 
expectations of standards of compliance with the Guidelines and have noted the 
recent expectation of an “unreasonably high burden of proof” (OECDWatch, 2014, p. 
18). 
3 A lack of enforcement powers
The ineffectiveness of the NCPs highlights a major weakness of the system: that 
NCPs have no clear mechanism of enforcement and very often simply fail to obtain 
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mediation through ‘goodwill’ (and this became obvious in cases such as RAID v 
Ridgepoint; Tremalt; and Alex Stewart (Assayers) Ltd; Parmalat v CUT-Brazil). A 
key feature of the process that is always in the background of such cases is an 
awareness of all parties that the NCPs cannot oblige companies to engage in the 
complaints process, although they can recommend the withdrawal of some 
government services. Thus, even when the complaint may appear to have serious 
cause, ultimately, the NCPs are dependent upon the cooperation of the companies.  
The tolerance of a system of regulation without enforcement (Tombs, 2016) may be a 
factor in the weakening of political will outlined in the previous section.  
In the Fenceline Community case, for example, complainants noted an unreasonably 
high confidentiality requirement during the procedure, but also specifically 
highlighted the NCPs lack of authority vis-à-vis the company. The Guidelines’ 
voluntary nature and the lack of an enforceable supervisory capacity for the NCPs 
was cited as a major problem in the Specific Instance Mechanism.  Accordingly, 
whilst the NCPs often went ahead with their review despite the company’s lack of 
cooperation in several of the cases – and some NCPs even found the companies in 
breach of the Guidelines or made recommendations in their final statements (e.g. 
Lawyers for Palestinian Human Rights v G4S; RAID v ENRC; Privacy International 
et al. v Gamma International) –NCPs could only make recommendations to the 
parties in those cases. 
The exception to this dependency on corporate ‘goodwill’ can be seen in Canada 
Tibet Committee v China Gold International Resources. In this case, in response to 
the company’s refusal to engage, the Canadian NCP imposed sanctions on the 
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company. The penalties included withdrawing Trade Commissioner Services and 
other Canadian advocacy support abroad. The NCP had the support of the Canadian 
government to act upon its decision. Despite the welcomed initiative by the Canadian 
NCP in this case, this kind of reaction from an NCP remains exceptional. 
Even in cases where the NCPs have demanded action, the corporations involved have 
sometimes simply ignored those demands. This happened perhaps most clearly in the 
cases Corner House et al. v BP, CRBM v ENI, ForUM and Friends of the Earth 
Norway v Cermaq ASA and Survival International v Vedanta Resources where the 
corporation simply disregarded the NCP’s requests. Lack of enforcement is thus a 
major weakness of the NCP process that has been recognised by others (see for 
example, Ruggie and Nelson, 2015) since governments do not generally provide any 
reinforcement or support for the NCPs when and if they find companies in breach of 
the Guidelines.
4 A lack of accountability
In a number of cases, unsatisfied complainants have taken their complaints further up 
the ladder of the Specific Instance Mechanism.  Some countries have set up 
procedures for complaints against NCPs. However, only a minority of countries have 
established complaints processes; and where these systems exist there is no 
consistency in their structures. This inconsistency is characteristic of the NCPs since 
countries have substantial flexibility in determining the structure and make-up of their 
NCPs (Genovese, 2016). In some contexts, complainants can request NCP oversight 
through ombudspersons, for example in Belgium and Finland, or in other contexts via 
appointed boards, as is the case in the UK. Complaints are filed after the final 
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assessment is made by the NCP in cases where the applicant(s) consider(s) the NCP 
not to have acted in accordance with its procedure, including for concerns of bias, 
negligence, etc. Ombudspeople are usually part of government and deal with 
complaints from several government sectors, as is the case in Belgium and Finland 
where complaints are made to Belgian Federal Ombudsman5 or the Finnish 
Parliamentary Ombudsman6. However, the UK has set up a Steering Board 
specifically for its NCP. In the UK, either party of the NCP’s mediation can ask for a 
review by the Steering Board if it feels the case has not been treated fairly or been 
given due consideration.
In Proyecto Gato v Tractebel, several NGOs sent a letter to the OECD requesting 
clarification on the interpretation of the Guidelines, arguing that the Belgian NCP had 
failed to treat the complaint in accordance with OECD rules. The NGO took their 
complaint further, and subsequently filed with the Belgian Ombudsperson against the 
NCP. Proyecto Gato’s complaint was upheld, although it is rare that complaints are 
upheld by national states.  And, in several cases brought by NGOs, the NCPs blatantly 
refused transparent, non-confidential dialogue consistent with the Procedural 
Guidance of the MNE Guidelines (e.g. CCFD et al. v Michelin; DECOIN et al. v 
Ascendant Copper Corporation); and in DECOIN et al. v Ascendant Copper 
Corporation, where the complainants ‘withdrew’ because of the unilateral decision of 
the NCP to a closed-door mediation; the company later used the withdrawal to claim 
that the case had been resolved.  
In IAC & WDM v GCM Resources plc, the complainants were so outraged by the 
NCP that they filed a complaint with the UK’s OECD Steering Board. In this case, the 
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NCP exhibited a bias in favour of the company when it refused to consider potential 
human rights impacts and focused instead upon less controversial issues such as the 
alleged failure by the company to follow its own self-regulatory standards. The NCP’s 
bias was hard to deny given that seven UN Special Rapporteurs had issued a joint UN 
press-release, calling for an immediate halt to the company’s proposed project 
because it was a threat to fundamental human rights, including the rights to food, 
water, adequate housing, freedom from extreme poverty and the rights of indigenous 
people. Whilst the Steering Board found the NCP to have committed errors and 
recommended that the complaint be re-examined, the NCP ignored the Board. It 
insisted in its final statement that the company was only in breach of its obligations to 
develop trusted self-regulatory practices and management systems. In its follow-up 
statement a year later, however, the NCP noted that no significant development had 
been made by the company, and thus nor in the conditions that led to the complaint. 
The entire complaint in this case was a series of frustrations for the complainants that 
ultimately had no impact on the human rights obligations of the company involved. 
In its in-depth analysis of the UK NCP, Amnesty International found a lack of 
predictability or consistency in applying the Guidelines that often comes down to a 
discretionary misinterpretation (Amnesty International, 2016). Moreover, it argued, 
there is little accountability of NCPs when this does happen. Amnesty found that 
inappropriately high evidential thresholds were being expected of complainants, often 
making “arbitrary judgements at the initial assessment stage without proper 
examination” (Ibid., p. 6). At the same time, “the expectations of the NCP towards 
companies to provide evidence of responsible business practice are not as stringent” 
(Ibid., p. 60). 
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What the four aspects identified in this analysis have in common is that they point to 
serious weaknesses in the NCP Process that make it difficult to claim that the OECD 
Guidelines are by any mark an adequate instrument with which to address corporate 
violations of human rights.  They indicate clearly, that the pursuit of a consensus has 
proven impossible to achieve.  Moreover, the analysis of this data demonstrates that 
the lack of regulatory force has effectively neutered the process.  The Specific 
Instance Mechanism relies on the participation of business in developing and 
enforcing its own regulation, together with a faith in consensus forms of policy-
making that do not rest on the resolution of conflict between interests, but instead 
seek a consensus that is palpably incapable of offering any true remedy to the victims. 
The lack of cooperation by corporations, the lack of enforcement by the NCPs, the 
criticisms of the NCPs voiced by the complainants, testimonies of NCP biases in 
favour of business, and a notable ineffectiveness of NCPs mean that this instrument is 
not well placed to offer effective remedy.   So far, the paper has analysed cases in the 
period August 2002-August 2016.   Yet as we note in the opening sections of this 
paper, the Specific Instance Mechanism has been subject to some reform and 
adjustment in light of the Ruggie Guiding Principles.  It is to the impact that those 
reforms have had on the Guidelines and their implementation that the next section of 
the paper turns. 
The Impact of the 2011 Reforms
The 2000 review of the Guidelines gave a stronger role to the NCPs, and extended 
their role in resolving issues related to the non-observance of the Guidelines by 
corporations.  It is this context that provides the motivation for our analysis of the 
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content of those cases and how the process generates particular outcomes in those 
cases.  
In his 2008 “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, John Ruggie explicitly 
recognised weaknesses in the Specific Instance Mechanism.  However, he located the 
weakness not in the process, or in the power asymmetries that are not addressed by 
the process – as we have here – but in the fine detail of the Guidelines. In his report, 
Ruggie called for a revision of the Guidelines noting their lack of specificity but also 
suggesting that many voluntary corporate codes of conduct or CSR policies adopted 
by companies and business organisations had exceeded the Guidelines and made them 
outdated (Ruggie, 2006, §46). He later attributed his own work to increases in the 
complaints lodged to NCPs by NGOs and workers’ organisations, following his 2008 
Framework stating that “NGOs as well as workers’ organizations drew on the 
Framework in lodging new complaints to OECD NCPs, which in part accounts for the 
increase in cases in the cycles 2010-2011” (Ruggie and Nelson, 2015, pp. 3-4).
A year after Ruggie’s Framework was adopted by the UN, the OECD began 
discussing a revision of the Guidelines that included a response to Ruggie’s 
recommendation that the NCPs be legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable, 
rights-compatible and transparent. As Mares notes, Ruggie also explicitly encouraged 
the OECD to adopt a due diligence approach in its guidance for responsible trade in 
conflict minerals (Mares, 2012). As we note above, Ruggie’s recommendations on the 
Guidelines were incorporated into its revision in 2011, coinciding with the end of his 
UN mandate and the presentation of the Guiding Principles. In his 2010 report to the 
UN, while noting some weaknesses, he concluded that the NCPs have “the potential 
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of providing effective remedy.” 
Our analysis scrutinised the post-2011 period is order to provide an indication of the 
impact of the Guiding Principles on the NCP Process. Using the same categories that 
we use in the analysis above, we analysed the outcomes of cases in the first ten years 
of the Specific Instance Mechanism and in the 4 years following (i.e. between August 
2002 and July 2012 and between August 2012 and August 2016).  
August 2002 - July 2012 
Of 265 complaints that wer  filed in this period there were at total of 175 unresolved 
cases, eighteen cases that were resolved or partially resolved via a separate process 
not involving the NCP, six cases in which external factors in the dispute between the 
parties changed the material outcome (e.g. corporate takeovers, bankruptcy or 
cessation of operations in that country), ten cases remained only partially resolved, 
thirty-two cases that yielded a mutually agreed outcome and twenty-four cases which 
were either blocked or where there was not enough information to adequately assess 
the case.
August 2012 - August 2016
The same analysis of data we have for the period following the 2011 reform to the 
OECD Guidelines (between August 2012 and August 2016), reveals that of a total of 
138 cases, eighty were unresolved, four cases were resolved or partially resolved via a 
separate process not involving the NCP, one case remained only partially resolved, 
fifteen cases yielded a mutually agreed outcome and thirty-eight cases that were either 
blocked, filed or pending. 
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As Table 1 below shows, whilst there was a peak in cases 2013, the numbers before 
and after the reform have remained relatively stable. Moreover, we would also note 
that within the 2013 data, of those complaints lodged, a relatively large number – 
amounting to just under half of cases – were rejected outright by NCPs.
Table 1. Cases lodged with NCPs August 2002-August 20167
<Insert Table 1 here>
Yet even if we did not take into account the peculiarities of cases included in the 2013 
figure, the relatively high total for this year does not significantly interrupt the trend: 
that by 2015, the total number of cases had reverted to approximately the same 
number of cases taken in 2002. This trend also serves as a clear indication that 
Ruggie’s assertion of the increase in claims is not warranted. Rather, there has been 
no significant change in the use of the Guidelines following the 2011 reforms. 
A close reading of the ‘Unresolved’ cases since the 2011 reforms reveals that a large 
number cases remain unresolved predominantly because the company refuses to 
engage in NCP mediation (those cases include: Canada Tibet Committee v China 
Gold Int. Resources; Lawyers for Palestinian Human Rights v G4S; CLEC & ERI vs 
Florida Crystals Corporation; American Sugar Refining Inc.; Sugar Cane Growers 
Cooperative of Florida; and Fanjul Corporation; Lok Shakti Abhiyan et. al v 
Government Pension Fund – Global; Ripley Corp S.A. v UNI Global Union and UNI 
Americas; Tower Semiconductor Ltd v RENGOR). Yet, as we indicated above, it is 
clear that in order to fully understand how particular outcomes in this process are 
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generated, we need to be able to understand how cases were successfully, as well as 
unsuccessfully, concluded.  
 
WWF v SOCO has become the poster-child of the 2011 reform of the Guidelines and 
has been praised as an example of successful NCP mediation for human rights cases 
(van’t Foort and Wilde-Ramsing, 2015). The complaint was brought by the 
environmental NGO World Wildlife Fund in 2013, based on the activities of the UK 
drilling company SOCO in Virunga national park, a UNESCO world heritage site in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The UK NCP accepted the majority of the 
complaint and hired an external mediator. The mediation resulted in an agreement 
with what has been considered a ground-breaking joint-statement in which SOCO 
agreed to cease its operations, committed to never again jeopardise the value of 
another UNESCO world heritage site and to conduct environmental impact 
assessments and human rights due diligence in line with international standards. 
However, whilst SOCO did cease its operations, it did not relinquish its operating 
permits leaving the company with a significant margin of manoeuver. The NGO 
Global Witness has criticised SOCO and the NCP resolution based upon a series of 
statements made by SOCO’s senior executives that give serious reason to doubt its 
human rights commitment. SOCO’s Deputy Chief Executive, Roger Cagle, has 
publicly stated in The Times newspaper that the agreement “forces DRC and 
UNESCO to come to some kind of accommodation” (cited in Global Witness, 2014); 
this suggests that they must find an arrangement that is beneficial for the company. 
Moreover, according to Global Witness, SOCO has also sought to reassure investors 
and make clear to the Congolese authorities that the joint-statement with the WWF 
did not signal a withdrawal from Virunga (Ibid.). Global Witnesses’ trepidations are 
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supported by the company’s subsequent actions. For example, one of the caveats of 
the agreement was that the company was allowed to complete a seismic survey inside 
Virunga Park to gather data on the park’s oil potential. SOCO did not relinquish its 
operating permits either, and so the park could still fall into a grey zone if it is 
declassified as a World Heritage Site or its boundaries are shifted. What this means in 
practice is that whilst SOCO backed off from any immediate oil exploration, it has not 
renounced its claim to eventual drilling and production in Virunga. More likely is that 
the corporation will try to use the results of its seismic survey – which confirmed that 
Virunga is sitting on a lot of oil – to lever the Congolese government’s decision.
Considered one of the major achievements of the 2011 Guidelines, the inclusion of 
the principle of due diligence adjusted the emphasis of earlier versions on the 
‘investment nexus’, which was abolished by the 2011 reform to the process (broadly 
defined as “MNEs’ practical ability to influence the conduct of their business partners 
is based on the extent to which they have an investment-like relationship” by Sisco et 
al., 2010, p. 16). Sisco et. al.’s critique of the ‘investment nexus’ concept was that it 
was “… too flexible and open to interpretation to be applied as a framework for 
responsible supply chain management” (Ibid). In theory, due diligence introduced a 
responsibility for corporations to carry out risk-based due diligence to identify, 
prevent and mitigate adverse impacts based on their investment relationships; thus 
suggesting, as Ruggie and Nelson (2015, p. 17) do, that corporations “… should avoid 
causing or contributing to adverse impacts on the social, environmental and other 
interests related to the Guidelines, not only through their own activities but also 
through their business relationships”. However, the system blockages we have 
identified and discussed above indicate a rather different state of affairs. Namely, that 
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despite the 2011 reforms, the principle of due diligence has not encouraged either a 
rise in the application of the procedure, or a focussing on minds in the boardroom.  
Thus, upon scrutiny of the outcomes of the cases, the deficiency in the OECD 
Specific Instance Mechanism appears to be one that allows for corporations to make 
commitments to the Guidelines’ due diligence provisions without the NCPs verifying 
whether the company followed through with those commitments (including 
identifying, preventing, mitigating and accounting for actual and potential human 
rights effects of business). Perhaps this is not surprising given that, as we indicate in 
the previous section of this paper, the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms 
creates major blockages in the system.  After all, what the Guidelines call for is that 
companies carry out due diligence according to their own assessment of the human 
rights situations in the specific contexts and of their eventual contribution to adverse 
human rights impacts. The measure of that contribution, and of the impact, is thus left 
to the company itself.8
It would appear in light of the empirical evidence presented in this section, that 
Ruggie and Nelson’s (2015, p. 16) belief that “… the Guidelines’ due diligence 
provisions provide companies with high level guidance on what they need to do to 
address the risk of contributing to human rights harm” may have been a little 
premature to say the least.  In practice, the 2011 revision has not yielded the kinds of 
results that can be said to be making a real difference in human rights terms. If 
anything, there has been very little change both in the very small number of cases 
initiated using this process and in their outcomes meaning that companies are as likely 
and as able as ever to disregard or disengage with the process or its recommendations. 
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Conclusion
Our analysis in this paper points to four major weaknesses with the OECD Guidelines 
that are rooted in its essentially ‘consensus’ approach.  First, companies continue to 
refuse to engage with the NCPs.  Second is that NCPs display a lack of political will 
to intervene in ways that challenge corporations.  Third, even if there was a clearer 
political will, because compliance with the Guidelines is effectively voluntary, there 
is no way for NCPs to oblige or coerce companies to participate in the process.  
Finally, given the lack of accountability for decisions made by NCPs, there is no 
adequate redress for complainants. All of this points to a fundamental asymmetry of 
power in which complaints remain structurally weak when they seek to invoke the 
Specific Instance Mechanism. 
Moreover, what the analysis of these cases suggests is that rather than providing a 
mechanism that encourages consensual decision-making, NCPs have a different role: 
they have sought to ‘manage’ complaints.  Indeed, the evidence indicates very clearly 
that the NCP process – one that relies upon the goodwill cooperation of business – has 
proven to be largely ineffective. In addition to these shortcomings, deeper 
consideration of the ‘success’ cases of the ‘human rights’ reform of the OECD 
Guidelines indicates that the reforms are not actually delivering the claimed 
outcomes, particularly with regards to the due diligence standard. 
To recap, we found that around one in eight cases was resolved to the mutual 
satisfaction of both parties.  On average this adds up to between three and four cases 
every year that are resolved with mutual agreement, anywhere in the world. We are 
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therefore dealing with a few cases that can, in global terms, barely be described as 
token. Indeed, recent research by OECD Watch (2018) albeit based on a much smaller 
sample of 18 NGO-led cases, found almost three quarters of cases “no remedy-related 
outcome whatsoever was achieved for the victims of corporate misconduct” (Ibid., p. 
2). This report drew a number of conclusions that we also draw: namely that “[t]he 
NCP system is currently an unpredictable patchwork of methods and structures” that 
often lacks adequate resourcing or political will (Ibid., p. 15).
In the period since the Guidelines’ 2011 reform, its success as measured in mutually 
agreed outcomes has remained unchanged. And as Table 1 above shows, rather than 
significant increases in cases, we see that there has in fact been a recent decline in the 
number of cases lodged with NCPs; and in 2014, the annual total of cases was the 
lowest since 2002. And this is where this ‘consensual’ principle begins to look 
flawed. Corporations know they do not have to cooperate, and, as we have shown, in 
a very large proportion of cases, corporations simply refuse to engage, safe in the 
knowledge that there are few consequences for ignoring the demands of NCPs. 
Our findings provide a cautionary tale for the UN Human Rights Council’s 2014 
Resolution for an international legally binding instrument on the human rights 
responsibilities of corporations (A/HRC/26/ L.22/Rev.1). The empirical evidence set 
out in this paper forewarns the UNHRC that any mechanism negotiated to address 
corporate violations of human rights cannot be based on weak enforcement, not least 
since corporations without the credible threat of meaningful enforcement are powerful 
enough to either ignore or undermine processes such as the Guidelines. 
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The Guidelines therefore have a more difficult task than is generally acknowledged in 
official commentaries, or in those of its most prominent champions. The Guidelines 
are seeking to intervene in a process that can never resemble a pluralistic process 
because of the gross imbalances of power between parties. As we have seen, some 
organisations are better placed to offer a more serious challenge to corporate power 
and which might fare better in such cases. Trade unions, who often represent workers 
in direct confrontation with their employers are much more used to dealing with 
disputes through dissensus rather than consensus. Because of their ability to take 
industrial action, trade unions are generally – though not always – better placed to 
confront corporations with a more direct threat of disruption to regimes of extraction, 
production and the distribution of goods. Human rights NGOs generally have 
different constituencies (they tend to be funded by dispersed groups of individual 
subscribers), they have different relationships to the people they struggle on behalf of, 
and may often be based in locations that are removed from those communities; and 
they operate differently, largely via different modes of public campaigning rather than 
industrial relations struggles. 
The difference in the social power base of those organisations and their different 
modus operandi may lead us to anticipate that they will use the process under 
different conditions and for different reasons. There is evidence in the data, that 
different types of organisations have different rates of success; for example, it appears 
that trade unions are generally more successful than NGOs in settling their cases 
without NCPs. And where trade unions do engage with the NCP Process, they are 
more successful in negotiating ‘mutually agreed’ outcomes. In our data, there were a 
total of nineteen mutually agreed outcomes in cases submitted by NGOs, whilst trade 
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unions negotiated twenty-seven, or around thirty percent more.  Without entering into 
a broader analysis of the role NGOs have played in furthering the neo-liberal agenda 
by undermining the role of the state (see for example Bandarage, 2011; Matanga, 
2010; Richards, 1977; Veltmeyer, 2005) we would argue that the key issue here is 
that the fora in which resolution is sought, by NGOs especially, through the OECD 
procedure remain distant from the struggles taking place on the ground. These 
resolutions tend to produce a few ‘successes’ that, as our analysis of the sample of 
cases here shows, is so insignificant as to make this a process more symbolic than 
real.
For these reasons, it is important that those the ongoing UN process develops a 
mechanism that allows opposing interests to be recognised rather than stifled; that 
recognises conflicts over the pursuit of corporate strategies as legitimate, rather than 
seeking to manage such conflicts through the creation of a fake consensus. 
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Endnotes:
1 See http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/; for more on the development of the Guidelines see Černič 
(2010).
2 Those include: EarthRights (see its call for reform at: www.earthrights.org/campaigns/reforming-
oecd-guidelines-multinational-investment); and Amnesty UK (see its call for reform at: 
www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/uk_ncp_review_exec_ summary.pdf). 
3 Our analysis does not distinguish between cases prior to and after the 2011 reforms to the process 
because, as we discuss later tin the paper, our analysis shows that fundamental problems with the 
Specific Instance Mechanism remain that have not been addressed by the revision. These ‘system 
blockages’ as we have called them following OECDWatch’s analysis, existed prior to the revision and 
remain intact.
4 All case citations can be found at Appendix 1.
5 In the Belgian system “The [federal] ombudsperson can examine the action and decisions of the 
administrative authorities from complaints lodged or at the request of the House of Representatives. 
They strive to find concrete solutions to problems and to reconcile the points of view of the citizen and 
the administration. Based on their investigations, the ombudspeople report to the House of 
Representatives, make and submit recommendations” 
(http://www.federaalombudsman.be/content/faqs).
6 According to its website, the Finnish Parliamentary Ombudsman “exercises oversight to ensure that 
public authorities and officials observe the law and fulfil their duties. The scope of oversight includes 
also other parties performing public functions. The aim is to ensure good administration and the 
observance of constitutional and human rights. The Ombudsman investigates complaints, launches its 
own investigations and carries out on-site inspections in official agencies and institutions” 
(http://www.oikeusasiamies.fi/Resource.phx/eoa/english/index.htx; see for example OECDWatch, 
2007).
7 Our analysis was delimited to cases from August 2002 to August 2016. For this reason, the number of 
cases for the years 2002 and 2016 do not take into account the total number of cases for these years but 
only cases from August to December 2002 and January to August 2016.
8 See also the similar critiques of the voluntarist implementation of ‘due diligence’ provisions by 
Blome (2016) and Human Rights Watch (2017).
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